СОВЕРШЕНСТВОВАНИЕ СИСТЕМЫ НАДЗОРА
В БАНКОВСКОЙ СФЕРЕ
Эффективный надзор за банковскими организациями является обязательным компонентом устойчивой экономики, в которой банковская система играет центральную роль в осуществлении платежей, привлечении и распределении сбережений. Задача надзора – добиться, чтобы банки функционировали безопасно и надежно, и чтобы они обладали достаточными капиталом и резервами для покрытия рисков, которые возникают в их деятельности. Строгий и эффективный банковский надзор обеспечивает общественное благо, которое не может быть в полной мере предоставлено рынком, и наряду с эффективной макроэкономической политикой важен для финансовой стабильности в любой стране. Хотя стоимость банковского надзора действительно высока, издержки от плохого надзора оказываются еще больше.
При разработке основополагающих принципов эффективного банковского надзора следующие правила являются основными:
основной целью надзора является поддержание стабильности и доверия к финансовой системе и тем самым снижение риска потерь для вкладчиков и других кредиторов;
органам надзора следует поощрять и поддерживать рыночную дисциплину, стимулируя хорошее корпоративное управление (посредством соответствующей структуры и перечня обязанностей для Совета директоров и высшего менеджмента), а также усиливая прозрачность рынка и контроль;
для эффективного выполнения своих задач орган надзора должен обладать оперативной самостоятельностью, средствами и полномочиями для сбора информации как на месте, так и путем проверки от четности, а также полномочиями по приведению в исполнение принимаемых им решений;
надзорные органы должны понимать характер деятельности, осуществляемой банками, и обеспечивать, насколько это возможно, управление должным образом рисками, которым подвергаются банки;
эффективный банковский надзор требует, чтобы оценивался уровень риска отдельных банков и соответствующим образом распределялись ресурсы органов надзора;
органы надзора должны добиваться того, чтобы у банков были ресурсы, необходимые для принятия на себя рисков, включая достаточный капитал, надежное управление и эффективные системы контроля и бухгалтерского учета;
необходимо тесное сотрудничество с другими органами надзора, особенно тогда, когда банковские организации осуществляют операции за рубежом [2].
Банковский надзор должен способствовать развитию эффективной и конкурентной банковской системы, которая отвечает общественной потребности в финансовых услугах хорошего качества по разумной цене. Вообще, необходимо признать, что существует компромисс между уровнем защиты, который обеспечивает надзор, и стоимостью финансового посредничества. Чем ниже допустимый уровень риска для банков и финансовой системы, тем более глубоким и дорогостоящим, скорее всего, будет надзор, в конечном счете, оказывая обратное воздействие на нововведения и распределение ресурсов.
Надзор не может и не должен гарантировать, что банки не потерпят банкротства. В рыночной экономике банкротства являются составляющей принятия на себя риска. То, каким образом осуществляются банкротства, убытки, которые при этом приходится нести, является в большой мере политическим вопросом, предполагающим принятие решений о том, следует ли и в какой степени направлять государственные средства на поддержку банковской системы. Поэтому такие вопросы не могут всегда находиться только в ведении органов банковского надзора, хотя надзорные органы должны располагать адекватным средствами для разрешения ситуаций с проблемными банками.
Существуют определенные компоненты инфраструктуры, необходимые для осуществления эффективного надзора. Там, где таких компонентов нет, органы надзора должны стараться убедить правительство их ввести (и должны участвовать в разработке и создании их).
В некоторых странах лицензирование банков отделено от процесса постоянного надзора. Вполне очевидно, что независимо от того, кто за это отвечает, процесс лицензирования предусматривает установление таких же высоких стандартов, как и процесс постоянного надзора, обсуждаются некоторые вопросы и принципы, которые должны применяться в процессе лицензирования [3].
Система надзора должна принимать во внимание характер рисков, присущих местному банковскому рынку, а также местную инфраструктуру. Таким образом, каждая страна должна определить, насколько необходимо дополнить стандарты надзора дополнительными требованиями для учета конкретных рисков и общих условий, превалирующих на ее собственном рынке.
Более того, банковский надзор – динамичная деятельность, которая должна реагировать на изменения на рынке. Следовательно, органы надзора должны быть готовы периодически пересматривать политику и практику надзора в свете новых тенденций или событий. Для того чтобы они могли это делать, нужна достаточно гибкая законодательная система [1].
Наряду с этим, надзор за банками является лишь частью более широкого круга мероприятий, которые требуются для поддержания стабильности на финансовых рынках. Эти меры включают:
1) надежную и последовательную макроэкономическую политику;
2) развитую государственную инфраструктуру;
3) эффективную рыночную дисциплину;
4) процедуры эффективного разрешения проблем в банках;
5) механизм обеспечения соответствующего уровня защиты системы (или сеть государственной безопасности).
1. Обеспечение надежной и последовательной макроэкономической политики не входит в компетенцию органов банковского надзора. Тем не менее органы банковского надзора будут вынуждены реагировать, если почувствуют, что проводимая политика подрывает безопасность и надежность банковской системы. При отсутствии разумной макроэкономической политики органы банковского надзора окажутся перед лицом практически невыполнимой задачи.
Поэтому надежная макроэкономическая политика должна быть основой стабильной финансовой системы.
2. Xорошо развитая государственная инфраструктура должна предусматривать следующие средства, неадекватное предоставление которых может сыграть значительную роль в дестабилизации финансовых систем:
систему законов, регулирующих предпринимательскую деятельность, включающую корпоративное законодательство, законы о банкротстве, контрактное право, законы о защите прав потребите лей и регулирующие права частной собственности, которая последовательно применяется и обеспечивает механизм справедливого разрешения споров;
подробные и четко определенные принципы и правила бухгалтерского учета, которые имеют широкое международное признание;
систему независимого аудита для крупных компаний, с тем чтобы пользователи финансовых отчетов, включая банки, имели независимое подтверждение со стороны несущих ответственность за свою работу аудиторов того, что отчеты предоставляют правдивую и ясную картину финансового положения компании и подготовлены в соответствии с установленными принципами бухгалтерского учета;
эффективный банковский надзор;
четко определенные правила регулирования и адекватного надзора за другими финансовыми рынками и в случае необходимости – за их участниками;
безопасную и эффективную систему платежей и клиринговых расчетов по финансовым сделкам там, где осуществляется контроль за рисками контрагентов [1].
3. Эффективная рыночная дисциплина зависит от адекватного поступления информации участникам рынка, соответствующих финансовых стимулов для поощрения хорошо управляемых институтов и мероприятий, гарантирующих несение инвесторами ответственности за последствия принимаемых ими решений [4]. Необходимо также учитывать такие вопросы, как корпоративное управление и обеспечение предоставления заемщиками инвесторам и кредиторам точной, существенной, ясной и своевременной информации. Сигналы рынка могут быть искажены и дисциплина подорвана, если правительства для достижения целей государственной политики не принимают во внимание или пытаются повлиять на коммерческие решения, особенно решения по вопросам кредитования. В таких обстоятельствах важно, чтобы при выдаче гарантий по подобным кредитам информация о них была раскрыта и были приняты меры по предоставлению компенсации этим финансовым институтам, если платежи по политическим кредитам прекратятся.
4. Необходимы достаточно гибкие полномочия для эффективного разрешения проблем в банках. В тех случаях, когда проблемы могут быть решены, органы надзора обычно будут стремиться найти и претворить в жизнь решения, которые полностью отвечают их требованиям; там, где это невозможно, необходимой частью эффективной финансовой системы является быстрая и организованная ликвидация институтов, которые больше не соответствуют надзорным требованиям. Терпимость, будь она результатом политического давления или нет, как правило, приводит к усугублению проблем и увеличению расходов на их разрешение. Надзорный орган должен отвечать за организованный вывод проблемных банков с рынка или принимать в нем участие, для того чтобы обеспечить как можно более полное и приоритетное перед акционерами, держателями субординированного долга и другими связанными сторонами возвращение средств вкладчикам из ресурсов банка (дополненное любым подходящим страхованием депозитов) [2].
В некоторых случаях интересы вкладчиков могут быть удовлетворены наилучшим образом путем реструктуризации в той или иной форме, возможно, через поглощение более сильным институтом или вливания нового капитала, или привлечения новых акционеров. Органы надзора могут способствовать такому исходу дела. Важно, чтобы окончательный результат полностью отвечал всем надзорным требованиям, был практически достижим за короткий и определенный промежуток времени, и чтобы вкладчики в то же время были защищены [1].
5. Принятие решения о приемлемом уровне защиты системы является в целом политическим вопросом, который должен находиться в компетенции соответствующих органов (включая центральный банк), особенно если это может привести к расходованию государственных средств. Органы надзора, как правило, будут также играть здесь определенную роль в силу своего глубокого знания имеющих к этому отношение институтов. Для того чтобы со хранить оперативную самостоятельность надзорных органов, необходимо провести четкое разграничение между ролью по защите системы и повседневным надзором за платежеспособными институтами. При разрешении системных вопросов нужно учитывать, с одной стороны, риски утраты доверия к финансовой системе и распространения недоверия на институты, которые в противном случае были бы платежеспособными, и с другой – необходимость минимизировать искажение сигналов рынка и рыночной дисциплины. Могут также быть задействованы соглашения о страховании депозитов там, где они существуют [3].
В эффективной системе банковского надзора должен быть четко определен круг обязанностей и целей каждого органа, участвующего в надзоре за банковскими организациями [3]. Каждый такой орган должен обладать оперативной самостоятельностью и достаточными ресурсами. Необходимо также соответствующее правовое обеспечение банковского надзора, включающее положения, касающиеся регистрации и лицензирования банковских организаций и постоянного надзора за ними; полномочия по проверке соблюдения законов, равно как и требований по безопасности и надежности, а также правовую защиту тех, кто осуществляет надзор. Между надзорными органами должны быть заключены соглашения о взаимном обмене информацией и сохранении ее конфиденциальности.
Каждый орган, участвующий в надзоре за банковскими организациями обязан иметь следующие компоненты:
четкую, достижимую и последовательную систему обязанностей и целей, установленных законодательством для каждого из участвующих в надзоре за банками органа надзора, но с оперативной самостоятельностью для реализации их независимо от по литического давления и с несением ответственности за их выполнение;
достаточное количество ресурсов (включая персонал, финансы и техническое обеспечение) для достижения поставленных целей при условии, что это не подрывает автономии, целостности и независимости надзорного органа;
систему банковского законодательства, которая определяет минимальные стандарты, которым должны отвечать банки; предоставляет органам надзора достаточную гибкость в установлении в административном порядке пруденциальных требований там, где это необходимо, в достижении поставленных целей, а также в использовании экспертных оценок; наделяет полномочиями собирать и самостоятельно проверять информацию и даст органам надзора право вводить ряд наказаний, которые могут быть применены при невыполнении пруденциальных требований (включая полномочия на снятие с должностей отдельных лиц, введение санкций и отзыв лицензий);
защиту (обычно правовую) от личной и институциональной ответственности за надзорные действия, добросовестно осуществленные в ходе выполнения обязанностей по надзору;
систему сотрудничества между органами надзора и обмена необходимой информацией между различными официальными организациями как национальными, так и зарубежными, отвечающими за безопасность и надежность финансовой системы; это сотрудничество должно быть подкреплено соглашениями о сохранении конфиденциальности надзорной информации и обеспечении ее использования только в целях эффективного надзора за имеющими к этому отношение институтами.
Учитывая современные темпы развития, как банковской индустрии, так и сопряженных с ней областей, можно говорить о том, что система банковского надзора во всем мире находится в состоянии непрерывного развития.
Список используемых источников
1. Банковский надзор. Европейский опыт и российская практика : пособие / под ред. М. Олсена. – Москва, 2005. – 357 с.
2. Гаврилюк О. Ю. Банковский надзор в России: применение зарубежного опыта с целью повышения его эффективности / О. Ю. Гаврилюк // Аудит и финансовый анализ. – 2008. - №4. С. 1-4.
3. Мурычева, А. В. Банковский надзор: каким ему быть? / А. В. Мурычева // Деньги и кредит. - 2007. - № 4. – С. 7-19.
4. Худякова Л. С. Реформа регулирования финансового сектора в Европейском союзе / Л. С. Худякова // Деньги и кредит. – 2014. - №4. С. 28-34.
Osipov V. S.
Dr. in Economics, Institute of Economics of RAS, Moscow, Russia
The State Research Institute of System Analysis of the Account Chamber
of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM OF RUSSIA: DYSFUNCTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
In his lecture during the Nobel Prize in Economics receipt Joseph Stiglitz considered the interconnection of state, market and non-market institutions and emphasized that several reasons were given against state interference in market relations after the growing theoretical understanding of ineffectiveness of markets with imperfect information [Stiglitz, 1977]. However, the analysis revealed that incentives and constraints related to state activities differ from those operating in the private sector. Therefore, even if the state and the private sector confront the same information constraints, in the first case welfare can be increased. Based on this analysis the speaker concluded that market mechanism can be efficient only under very certain circumstances. Thus it is possible to avoid dysfunctions in sustainable economic system development if state institutions, market and non-market institutions are combined.
In general it should be emphasized that mistakes of development model choice, current system of governance and its impact on the control object, lack of professional skills in social and economic processes management are the grassroots of all dysfunctions. Management failures in the development process lead to dissatisfaction of public demands and consequently to the aggravation of social problems. As Robert Merton pointed out, "tensions accumulated in the social structure as a result of dysfunction ... will eventually lead to the institutional collapse and profound social changes" [Merton, 1949].
From the evolution theory perspective dysfunctional tendencies are an integral part of development process. It is essential to minimize the time gap between the dysfunction detection and the solution of system unbalance. Dysfunction can be avoided through timely cause-and-effect analysis of economic system unbalance. Dysfunctions inherent in the real economic system of Russia are currently determined by a number of factors.
We have already attempted to classify public administration dysfunctions by areas of government bodies activity and types of government services [Silvestrov, Zeldner, Osipov, 2015]. However the current economic situation in the country and external factors resulted in the necessity to add another classification - by decision-making horizons. Thus, the administrative reform of 2004 was designed to divide the functions of ministries and to separate legislative functions (remaining by the ministries), state functions execution (agencies) and supervision functions (service and supervisions). The major idea was not only to get rid of redundant and excessive functions, but also to transform the ministries into strategic decision-making bodies and make those responsible for reforms in the relevant areas of public administration and economic system. Over the time some agencies were eliminated (i.g. the Federal Agency for Agriculture), new ministries and departments were created. As a result, the number of government bodies increased greatly rater than declined, which had led to bureaucracy growth, its effectiveness reduction and increase of its maintenance costs. Economic crisis and unfavorable external environment require more efficient fund spending, and hence optimization of the public administration system. International practices should be considered, for example, the experience of the USA which has also faced the problem of economy bureaucratization. The scope of US economy allows to level major bureaucratic problems, thus the increase of public administration economic efficiency is directly related to the reduction of redundant functions and the following decline of excessive number of public employees and government bodies.
In addition, it has currently become the problem for ministries to have no opportunities for bearing responsibility for strategic decisions aimed at overcoming economic crisis and external negative effects. It becomes clear that the regime of "manual economy management" despite its effectiveness during rapid economic growth does not work under economic crisis, when expectation of commands and short-term issues solution in expense of strategic action leads to aggravation of negative consequences for the economy.
Now it has become obvious that there is no body in the country which could be responsible for coordinating government actions on development and implementation of necessary reforms. The ministries are overloaded with current issues and that has resulted in reluctance to elaborate and enforce necessary structural economic reforms. Previously the Center of Reforms under the Government of the Russian Federation was this strategic body. Currently there is no such body in Russia and the President has to gather officials in the Kremlin, who were ministers once (namely, A. Kudrin, G. Gref and others) to understand what needs to be done to launch the anti-crisis government plan under falling oil prices and strengthening of economic sanctions.
It is obvious that such occasional consultations will not lead to serious elaboration of reform projects, therefore it is necessary to reestablish the permanent state body under the President of the Russian Federation, constantly and systematically engaged in development and coordination of structural reforms implementation. Currently, the most common public administration dysfunctions are premature reforms and steps that lead to degradation compared to the base period. For example, severe increase in tax burden (social expenditures) for individual entrepreneurs has led to closure of 1.5 million enterprises or their transfer to the shadow economy.
Now the Parliament considers reduction of social expenditures from 30% to 14% and the Russian Government develops new programs to support small and medium-sized business. Why undertake actions which lead to the closure of every third individual entrepreneur, and then design programs to save the remaining ones by budget funding? Obviously the reason is the lack of elaboration of these change and its consequences forecast, as well as departmental interests. Systematic development of structural reforms and their implementation coordination as well as immediate adjustment in the case of system errors are needed today. It had become more typical for modern reforms that the burden of economic disasters is put on vulnerable groups and small business. As F. Fukuyama notes it is typical not only for Russia, “…heavier tax burden will be laid on those who could oppose it the least” [Fukuyama, 2011]. It is necessary to refer here to the IMF report, which empirically proves that economy grows when the income of the poor is growing. If the income of the wealthiest 20% of the population increases by 1%, the GDP reduces by 0.1%, but when the revenues of the least affluent 20% of the population grow by the same 1%, the country’s GDP increases by 0.4%. The report was based on results of four years of observations in 150 countries.
What are the costs and consequences of such false actions? These are reduction of tax revenues and suppression of entrepreneurial initiative during economic crisis, as well as decline of effective demand, because the least wealthy citizens and small business tend to spend money quickly.
The second important systemic dysfunction which has surfaced during economic crisis is personnel policy in the public administration bodies. Manual economy management does not need creative initiative and innovative-minded employees, only executors are needed.
Competent executors are certainly necessary, however development of solutions is an equally or even more important task as external environment requires immediate reaction to changes and it will not wait for the bureaucratic machine to turn towards it. The consequence of such personnel policy is an obvious delay in decision-making and aggravation of decision-making dysfunctions. The Government intends to change the education policy and to start educating a new class of public servants who can elaborate and make strategic decisions. However, under monopolization of civil servants training system on the basis of RANEPA under the President of the Russian Federation the result is unlikely to be reached (RANEPA and HSE support the anti-monopolies fight only in unimportant areas, but severely reject it in the areas of their direct interest).
The next strategic dysfunction is the creation of financial system in which there is no place for the real economy as a recipient of financial resources; it acts only as a donor.
(see Exhibit 1, 2).
The chart clearly shows that in the current economic model financial mediators accumulate financial resources not only from the Central Bank (credits) from the population (deposits) but also from the real sector (investments in the charter capital). Instead of financing real economy the financial sector withdraws funds and directs them either into currency speculations, or to the offshores. After that the funds are partially re-exported to the country, but already as foreign investments.
This economic system is typical not only for Russia but also for China. To prove this statement it is sufficient to look at the Russia's largest corporations system of financing, including those with state participation.
The main problem is that the actions of state corporations distort the principles of market economy in many areas where they are the key players, which results in systemic dysfunctions. Unlike private companies that maximize profit, state corporations maximize performance indicators which they receive from the government above.
For example, "Gazprom" is building economically inefficient gas pipelines rather than establishing customer relations. The funds spent on construction of the "Northern" and "Southern Stream" could be used for creation of gas liquefaction plants network and for supplies diversification. "Rosneft" demands from RUB 300 bln to 2.4 trl from the National Welfare Fund and other funds for development of new deposits. However, if deposits are profitable resources for their development can be attracted on the market. If deposits are unprofitable then it makes no sense to develop them until new production technologies appear. The same applies to many infrastructure projects of the Russian Railways, Olympic and football construction projects, etc. Management which maximizes cost for shareholders would have never invested in such projects.
When companies do not maximize profit but rather natural indices (i.g. linear meters, developed deposits, energy security, tons of iron and steel and so on) imposed by the state it may gradually degrade to a full-fledged revival of the planned economy and further suppression of entrepreneurial initiative.
We argue that corporations are not to blame for this situation. It is a dysfunction of public administration which has led to such a system where funds withdrawal from the country is more profitable than investment. Here we face an important state administration system dysfunction - institutional dysfunction of public administration system.
Finally, the decision-making strategy in the public administration system should be changed from "patching holes model" to management by objectives, which results in identification of priority issues and tools for solution with account of strategic decision-making. The development of priority areas should be entrusted to the body responsible for elaboration and implementation of structural reforms.
R. Higgs proves that a certain internal or external, real or imaginary "crisis", which may even be caused or provoked by the actions of the state is used to launch new programs designed to mitigate or eliminate its effects. These always include expansion of state authority and its interference into areas that have previously been out of its competence [Higgs, 1987].
The Government constantly faces a dilemma: either to admit to its citizens that it is ineffective or to continue the economic policy of state regulation strengthening for "overcoming crisis consequences" which has been generated by the government regulation itself. The Italian scientist Vilfredo Pareto wrote: "In October 1921 the government can choose one of the two ways to cope with the current crisis: to leave it all to the laws of economy or to intervene and start managing social and economic processes. It chose the second path" [Pareto, 1984].
Pareto further says that this choice "ultimately only exacerbates evil". As it can be seen, it is not the first time the government decides to take the "second way". Obviously, the choice is determined by the desire to win parliamentary or presidential elections. Instinctively people understand that if the economy resides into crisis, it is necessary to begin manual management of economic processes. People are unable to understand that this could be a false path, despite examples of social and economic history of the developed countries.
Let us now consider a very special product - public services. A lot of research has been devoted to this issue. The most notable one is made by the Nobel Prize in Economics winner, American professor Joseph Stiglitz. He poses a question: "How the economic role of the state has grown over the last 50 years?" [Stiglitz, 1977]. The fact of the state's role increase is not even disputed. Arguing with some Russian economists who believe that the state has distanced itself from problem solving and insufficiently regulates economic relations, Stiglitz writes: "In the former Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc ... the major share of economic activity accounted for the state" [Stiglitz, 1977]. J. Le Grand advocates a more liberal way and proves the need to introduce competitive market mechanisms in the sphere of public services [Le Grand, 2007].
It turns out that while economists disagree in assessing the state role in the economy, they agree that the state has increased its role in economic relations by complication and strengthening of government regulation. However, this has not lead to overcoming crisis effects in the economy or to increasing consumer satisfaction level in public goods. Nevertheless the latter has happened more as a result of competition for markets rather than or even in spite of the state actions. To sum it up, state regulation in certain moments of history (as during the Great Depression in the United States) contributes to neutralization of negative consequences for the broader population, but in the same time restrains economic development and leads to economic crisis (i.g. 1960-70’s in the US and Western Europe, the economic crisis of 2008-2009). Thus it is possible the appeal to the state intervention, but its long-term effects are not so pleasant as could have been expected. Moreover, not all economists saw government intervention in the economy, especially in the United States during the Great Depression, as salvation. Some sources claim that the US recovery from deep recession has occurred not because of the government actions but rather in spite of it [Rothbard, 2000].
The latter is particularly important in healthcare and education, which are traditionally under broad state regulation (from strict criteria and licensing in the US to almost complete nationalization in Russia). Does this mean that nationalization leads to better quality of consumer needs satisfaction? Judging by the state of healthcare and education sectors in Russia it obviously does not. Therefore, to satisfy consumer demands there needs to be a balance between state regulation and free market. Consequently both sides of this "conflict of interests" should be balanced in influence or participation in the economy.
The role of the state in the past 50 years has increased however economic crises are becoming deeper and longer. We believe that the time has come to change this stereotype and to stop encouraging the government to strengthen its already extensive interference in the economy, to provide an opportunity for competition as a basic market relations mechanism to operate in full. If business wants to overcome crisis then it should participate rather than expect help from the government. The cost of state interference will be increased government regulation and taxation in the period of prosperity which will put pressure on business. Business should be more responsive to consumer needs, to improve service quality and try to maximize consumer satisfaction level. However, this recommendation is totally inapplicable to large state corporations, since their only interest is to strengthen influence on decision-makers and to receive additional budget allocations for megaprojects.
A prominent economist Friedrich von Hayek in his famous article "Competition as a Discovery Procedure" wrote the following on the necessity to change the government role: "... strange as it may seem at first glance, the high growth rate sometimes speaks not so much of good policy now rather than of bad policy in the past. Consequently, in the countries with already high development level there is no reason to expect an equally significant growth, comparable with the countries where effective resources use have been hampered by legal and institutional barriers for a long time” [Hayek, 2002].
Thus, high economic growth achieved by favorable external environment (first and foremost due to high prices for natural resources) do not testify the success of state economic policy, but rather a deterrence of economic development by state economic management.
The change of state role in economic relations can occur in several directions. Some of them are already at the preliminary stage in our country, namely, the launch of anti-corruption actions, the continuation of a difficult and long-lasting reform to reduce administrative barriers in economy, the introduction of financial ombudsman institute for protection of business against illegal actions of public authorities.
It is necessary to continue reforms aimed at changing the role of the state, to abandon direct intervention in economic processes and the so-called "manual control" of economic relations.
The American specialist in the study of competition and competitiveness of national economies, M. Porter distinguishes the following factors as determinants of modern national economy competitiveness. On the one hand, it is the quality of national producers, on the other hand the quality of political and economic environment in a country [Porter, 1998].
Therefore the value of such comparative advantages as natural resources, climate conditions, as well as benefits acquired during previous development, such as technology level, production experience, reduces significantly under modern conditions. However, the importance of such competitiveness factor as institutional structure of the state increases greatly.
It seems obvious that a satisfied customer is the basis of prosperity of any business. However, in business practice standardization of procedures, clichés have substituted the contents. Business becomes mechanistic, inanimate and customers feel it, as it is often uncomfortable to buy products in the way established by the seller (methods of selling goods are uncomfortable for the customer).
The consumer suffers the consequences of this shift of importance, as he lacks high quality food, housing, healthcare, education, roads, etc., as well as qualitative public services. In such system opinion of the consumer does not matter. It results in growth of social discontent with authorities of all levels, increase of dissent and unrest, social appeals to the government to "rein in the overweening business".
The faster the federal authorities will understand the need to change the state role in economic processes regulation, the greater the chances that Russia will be able to build a competitive economy based on innovation and knowledge, and the faster will the Russian citizens - consumers - have the opportunity and access to qualitative products and public services.
In addition, the result of such government role alteration is the mutual antagonism of business and state which will not allow either of the parties to aggravate negative consequences of a new economic crisis, and might even help to level these consequences for the weakest side of the "triangle" - citizen and consumer. Not to give the reader the impression that we reject the state as an institution, we will quote a prominent libertarian economist Ludwig von Mises: "The state itself is not evil, it is a necessary and wholesome institution which is essential for development and preservation of sustainable social cooperation and civilization" [von Mises, 1978]. At the same time, public authorities should change their interaction with business and society for the benefit of all the three communities, since the state can be either a strong partner of business and society, or the oppressor of the latter [Zeldner, 2010].
Let us consider the problem of business taxation. Firstly, tax is a statutory way of partial income takeoff from business and people in favor of the state. Taxes as costs slightly harm the economy of large companies, but are deadly for small business. Therefore, in competitive struggle large corporations are interested in state policy of tax increase, since it eliminates competition from small business.
This is another argument for reducing the state role in economy in general and in cluster policy in particular. Government regulation leads to industry monopolization and cartelization, which results in higher prices and limited production, competition and progress, as can be seen on the case of rail and air transport regulation, oil and gas extraction and public services [Rothbard, 2006]. It should be noted that Finland, Sweden and some other countries have achieved leadership in competitiveness through clustering. Formation of market-oriented clusters in Russia will allow public authorities and local governments to promote innovative development of business entities" [Osipov, 2013]. Why state authorities should encourage innovative development? Why not to assign this to the market? And how public authorities will do it without commitment? The state is often considered a genius which is able to solve all problems, while the state is a group of ordinary people, worried only about keeping their position. It is not an insult to public officials, it is a fact. This activity motivation is the most typical for the current stage of the Russian economy and Russian democracy development. Lack of responsibility for decisions made, rigid power vertical, low level of education and culture of public officials undermine the possibilities of the state to regulate and, moreover to stimulate anything. It is necessary to give business an opportunity at last to decide whom to encourage, where to invest and what to produce under market rules. When the state creates various barriers and obstacles for business, it gives root to corruption. After all, corruption is in its essence simply a method to overcome barriers of the state authorities. A simple and effective way to fight corruption is to remove excessive state economic processes regulation. The degree of construction process over-regulation in Moscow has led to the exile of small business from construction in the city, as it takes about 5 years to only conform initial permits. No small business will survive such conditions. In addition, no bureaucrat is interested in development, improvement or promotion. These factors together prove the need to reduce government involvement in economic relations.
Radical reduction of regulation is likely to bring the dismissal of officials at all levels, and hence the cost of public administration will be curtailed (including salaries of fired officials, office buildings, equipment and other expenses). Reduction of government spendings will allow to significantly cut tax levies. This reduction of tax levies will stop the flawed practice of wealth redistribution in favor of inefficient administration and will guarantee money for an efficient private entrepreneur.
Reduction of administrative functions
Reduction of administrative personnel
Reduction of taxation
Scheme 1. Logical succession of economic stimulation measures
Undoubtedly, the implementation of this program will require the revival of administrative reform of 2004, when the study of public functions has started and sunk into oblivion.
Mass redistribution of national income through taxation system leads to decrease of resource use efficiency (from simple negligence and mismanagement to corruption), while the entrepreneur will find a more effective application of taxes levied as his actions are guided by the invisible hand of the market.
Increase of budget efficiency will automatically lead to expansion of business activity, job creation and finally to economic growth. In addition, reduction of taxes and simplification of tax administration results in significant improvement of investment climate. Taxation reduction is possible under budget balance maintenance, i.e. at least the lack of budget deficit.
This is possible only under conditions of planned reduction of budget spendings, we suppose it means reduction of public administration expenditures, administrative apparatus, transfer of the majority of state functions to private commercial organizations. This will not only create new areas of business activity, but will also expand the ground for economic growth through deregulation. Here the sphere for B-2-B services business will appear, which will effectively function exactly on the basis of value chain management.
The development of cluster system as a system-forming factor in innovation and technology involves modernization of the real sector of economy and increase of its competitiveness at different levels. With such approach clusters become the leading economic growth points.
One of the most effective mechanism for creating models of public service delivery is a "model of voice", which A.Hirschman characterized as: "a model of voice is an attempt to change an undesirable state of affairs by means of individual or collective call to the immediate management, or to higher authorities able to influence the management; or by different types of actions and protest, including mobilization of public opinion [Hirschman, 1970].
We are convinced that distribution of powers should happen not only on industry and competencies basis, but also on the basis of macroeconomic planning horizon - tactical and strategic management. To execute the second task, we consider it necessary to call upon a new management body as an over-ministerial institution in management system.
References
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